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Lars Løvlie
Rereading Jürgen Habermas‘ „Strukturwandel
der Öffentlichkeit“
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Beitrag gibt zunächst einen kurzen
Überblick über Jürgen Habermas’ Buch
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, das
erstmals 1962 erschienen ist. In der Mo-
nographie wird die historische Entstehung
der öffentlichen Sphäre als intellektueller
Raum beschrieben, welcher durch die le-
sende und diskutierende Öffentlichkeit seit
dem frühen 17. Jahrhundert geschaffen
wurde. Zugleich rekonstruiert Struktur-
wandel der Öffentlichkeit“ aber auch eine
Idealversion der öffentlichen Sphäre, vor
deren Hintergrund die folgende Geschichte
der Öffentlichkeit beurteilt werden kann.
Der Verlauf der weiteren Geschichte der Öf-
fentlichkeit, die mit der strukturellen Trans-
formation der öffentlichen Sphäre im 20.
Jahrhundert ihren Höhepunkt erlebte, wird
von Habermas anhand dieser Folie als eine
Geschichte des Niedergangs interpretiert.
Ich werde mich mit dieser Darstellung
auseinandersetzen und zu der ursprüngli-
chen Frage von Habermas nach der Ent-
stehung der Öffentlichkeit im Rahmen ei-
ner heutigen – postmodernen – Perspektive
zurückkehren. Anhand zweier Beispiele
(den Benettonanzeigen von Toscani und der
Internetbuchhandlung Amazon.com), schla-
ge ich vor, dass die öffentliche Sphäre we-
der durch den Staat noch durch den Markt
zum Verschwinden gebracht wird, sondern
dass sie immer wieder in traditionellen als
auch in überraschend neuen Erschei-
nungsformen entsteht.
Abstract
This article starts with a short review of
Habermas’ Strukturwandel der Öffentlich-
keit, published in 1962. The book describes
the historical birth of the public sphere as
the intellectual space created by a reading
and debating public from the early 18th cen-
tury. The Strukturwandel reconstructs an
idealised version of the public sphere as
well, which functions as a benchmark for
the judgement of the later history of the
public sphere. The later history, which
culminates in the structural transforma-
tion of the public sphere in the 20th cen-
tury, the book generally presents as a
story of decline. I take issue with that
story, and want to return to Habermas’
original question of the birth of the public,
within the perspective of our own post-
modern times. By way of two examples –
Toscani’s Benetton advertisements and the
Amazon.com bookstore – I suggest that the
public sphere is not eclipsed by the state
and the market, but is regularly coming
into being both in traditional and in more
surprising settings.
In the next section I critique Habermas’
rationalist pretensions for excluding ab-
normal or border rationalities, like gender.
This is a critique that has been levelled
against Habermas over the past two dec-
ades, and points to a lacunae in his theory
of liberal democracy in general.
The third and last section takes up the
question of the birth of the public sphere
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Im zweiten Abschnitt kritisiere ich Haber-
mas’ Rationalitätsansprüche, da sie unge-
wöhnliche oder randständige Rationalitäts-
formen wie z.B. das Geschlecht ausschlie-
ßen. Diese Kritik wird seit zwei Jahrzehn-
ten gegenüber Habermas erhoben und ver-
weist ganz allgemein auf einen Mangel in
seiner Theorie einer liberalen Demokratie.
Der dritte und letzte Abschnitt betrachtet
die Frage nach dem Ursprung der öffentli-
chen Sphäre aus einer Perspektive, die
sich von der Habermasschen unterschei-
det. Hierbei geht es um die philosophische
Frage nach der Freiheit, bevor diese in
idealisierten Voraussetzungen, Kategorien
des Vernünftigen oder Unvernünftigen oder
im Verfahren des rationalen Diskurses in-
stitutionalisiert wurde. In dieser Perspekti-
ve bringt sich die Freiheit selbst in Er-
scheinung. Das traditionelle Konzept der
Toleranz, welches ich eine Politik der Tole-
ranz genannt habe, schließt an diese Vor-
stellung von Freiheit an. Diese Auffassung
des Politischen unterscheidet sich sowohl
von der Habermasschen Konzeption des
Politischen als Versöhnung als auch von ei-
ner postmodernen Politik der Differenz,
ohne diese beiden jedoch auszugrenzen.
in a perspective different from Habermas’.
It raises the philosophical question of
freedom before freedom has been institu-
tionalised in idealised presuppositions,
categories of reasonable and unreasonable,
or in procedures of rational discourse. On
this view freedom is its own birth or com-
ing-into-presence. The traditional concept
of toleration is latched on to this last idea
of freedom in what I have called a politics
of toleration. This politics is different both
from a Habermasian politics of reconcilia-
tion and a postmodern politics of differ-
ence – without excluding them.
1. Closing the circle
Jürgen Habermas’ Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit has become part of his on-
going quarrel or Auseinandersetzung with theoretical opponents on the ques-
tions of a liberal democracy over the past 40 years. Therefore the book should be
read beyond its own context of the Sixties. To my mind only John Dewey has as
consistently as Habermas argued for democracy as participation and communi-
cation. What Dewey did for the theory of a liberal democracy in the first part of
the last century, Habermas did in the second part. They have both made it clear
that a theory of democracy must be normative and open to the test of experi-
mental or argumentative reasoning. A theory of liberal democracy exposes its
own premises and practices to the litmus test of argumentation; and it is able to
transform those premises and operate as an ‘avenging force’ in history, as
Habermas himself has it (Habermas 1982:227). Since liberal democracy can only
be sustained in a self-critical mode, the philosopher of democracy will cut a con-
troversial figure in the contemporary debate over matters cultural, social and
political.
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Habermas’ trajectory takes him from the Strukturwandel to the critique of in-
strumental action, which had its final expression in Erkenntnis und Interesse
(1968). In the Seventies his thinking took the ‘pragmatic turn’, which culminated
in the Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981). In the Eighties he worked
out the communicative theory of action as based on the quasi-transcendental sup-
positions of the ideal speech situation and the better argument, with consensus as
the ideal limit of discourse. That decade also witnessed his critical and tempera-
mental refutation of French deconstruction in Der philosophische Diskurs der
Moderne (1985). The Nineties inaugurated a slight shift from a broad perspec-
tive of discourse ethics towards the theory of the constitutional state, that is,
towards a political and juridical universalism. Even if the move narrowed the
pretensions of his discourse ethics, ethics is kept as a fundamental part of his
conception of legality. The themes of Faktizität und Geltung (1992) and the later
political essays presented in Die postnationale Konstellation (1998) and Die Ein-
beziehung des Anderen (1999), close the circle with that of the Strukturwandel.
What this early book treated in terms of the public sphere and its genesis, the
latest books treat in terms of a constitutional state and a deliberative democracy
that reproduces itself by rational discourse and negotiations.
1.1. Reinventing the public sphere
The Strukturwandel is a history of the public sphere from its birth in the late
17th century to postmodernity. It is a story that takes us from the literary dis-
cussions in German Tischgesellschaften, French salons and English coffee houses
from around 1700 to the American talk shows of the Sixties. It is the story, too, of
the decline and fall of the public sphere, of its progressive corrosion in the 20th
century, under the influence of a state paternalism that makes the citizen into a
client and a media world that makes her into a consumer of information or ‘info-
tainment’. In the Strukturwandel the bourgeois public sphere is defined as the
‘[f]orum in which the private people, come together to form a public, readied
themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion.
The publicum developed into the public, the subjectum into the [reasoning] sub-
ject, the receiver of regulations from above into the ruling authorities’ adversary’.
(Habermas 1989:25f). The public sphere began as a family affair. It developed out
of the private sphere of family production and commodity exchange, reading so-
cieties and voluntary associations that often met in private houses. The public
nourished itself on the growing popularity of the novel, from Samuel
Richardson’s Pamela (1741) over Rousseau’s Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse (1761)
to Goethe’s Werther (1774). Its centre was the bourgeois citoyen or citizen, and
the city became the space where his inner moral and intellectual life could be
transformed into a public concern.
Richardson’s life is exemplary of how private life and work as a printer and
writer was connected with the public sphere. He was born the son of a joiner and
apprenticed to a printer before he struck out on his own. As an independent
craftsman he typically combined printing and publishing. He produced books,
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journals, advertisements and posters. In due time he became famous for enter-
taining week-end guests at his modest ‘country’ house, with readings and liter-
ary parties – a prime example of how private life, hard work and cultural inter-
ests came together to form a literary public. Pamela started as a series of ‘fa-
milial letters’ on the concerns of everyday life – as a boy Richardson used to
write letters for young lovers – and grew into a book after he was encouraged by
his fellow printers to publish them. The novel became an important part of the
self-education of the bourgeois reading public, and created the first popular link
between private life and public interest.
Around the middle of the 18th century a general culture of reading thus came
into being around the novel, fired by the theme of love rather than of political
strife – the subtitle of Rousseau’s Julie is ‘Letters of two lovers who live in a
small town at the foot of the Alps’. There is also the appearance of the two peri-
odicals, The Tatler and The Spectator, which existed only for a short period
around 1710, written and edited by Joseph Addison and Richard Steele. As old
Oxford students, the two gentlemen used to begin their essays without a title
but with a citation from Greek or Latin. These periodicals did not carry news,
nor did they practice what we would call critical journalism. In a piece written
in 1710, Steele indulges himself ‘[i]n the softnesses of humanity, and enjoy[s]
that sweet anxiety which arises from the memory of past afflictions’.1 These are
pieces, not on politics, but on ordinary life, lifted into universal humanity by the
sensibilities of a literary person. In this context we should not forget Jonathan
Swift’s satires, the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the
History of Civil Society (1767), the writings of the French philosophes and Rous-
seau, and von Humboldt on the Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates (1792),
even if that book had a rather limited public.
The rich and manifaceted publicity of the 18th century created a public sphere
that functioned as the more or less informal network of people who broach
themes, opinions and points of view in contexts of disagreement and public de-
bates. These networks were substantiated in the voluntary associations of civil
society, which formed their social and political substrate. Civil society typically
consisted of voluntary non-profit associations, independent of state power and
the market. It was not dominated by the paternalist prejudice that its citizens
are not able to act on their own as responsible persons. And even if civil society
was embedded in the private economic sphere, its use of reason was not eco-
nomic but political in the classical sense of the term polis. Only in retrospect can
we appreciate what the early makers of the public sphere brought into being:
the institutions of objective, unprejudiced rational discussions based on knowl-
edge and the personal conviction that truth should prevail between members of
a just society. Those who were willing to engage in these ‘democratic’ practices
were welcome to participate as equals rather than as members of a social class
or estate. A moral interiority went along with exterior institutions like the de-
bating society to form the practices that eventually made up the public sphere.
It is of some importance to see the everyday beginnings of the public sphere in
the more or less humdrum circumstances of a society of craftsmen, shopkeepers
and men of letters. Richardson’s career points to the intimate link between the
book as a commodity and the spread of public reasoning in a world of exchange
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and communication. ‘Inasmuch as culture became a commodity and thus finally
evolved into ‘culture’ in the specific sense (as something that pretends to exist
merely for its own sake), it was claimed as the ready topic of a discussion
through which an audience-oriented (publikumsbezogen) subjectivity communi-
cated with itself.’ (Habermas 1989:29). The bourgeois family values of interiority
or Innerlichkeit that circulated in the expanding literary world combined with
the values of labour and commodity exchange to open a public sphere. Work for
profit went along with participation in practices that moved people towards a
common ground of a humanity, and thus transcended their individual interests
and prejudices in the institution of public reasoning.
1.2. The structural transformation of the public sphere
I have sketched the historical background that the Strukturwandel draws on in
its description of the structural changes of the public sphere that took place in
the 20th century. The story so far has been of the ‘classical’ enlightened public
sphere, based on a reading public that is tied together by the bonds of intimacy,
authenticity and public reasoning. The following story, which takes up the last
part of the book, is about the decline and fall of the public. The decline takes
place through a transformation of the relationship between the state and civil
society. In this transformation, private corporate bodies start to take over public
functions whilst on the other hand the state extends its authority over the pri-
vate sector. As the state intervenes in the social sphere the boundaries between
public and private dissolve: ‘From the midst of the publicly relevant sphere of
the civil society was formed a repoliticized social sphere in which state and so-
cietal institutions fused into a single functional complex that could no longer be
differentiated according to criteria of public and private.’ (Habermas 1989:148).
The mixture of private interests and public authority serves to restrict the open
space of free discussion, unencumbered by vested interests or political power.
What is genuinely public does not survive in a welfare state that takes over the
role of the family in legislation and the functions of civil society in politics.
These include the classical risks of unemployment, accident, illness and old age,
as well as education, care and guidance. This transformation, which lost the eye
for truth- and justice-related discourses, takes place as the ‘refeudalisation’ of
society by the modern welfare state.
In this process the reproductive tasks of the family are severely curtailed. The
family cannot any longer foster the social spirit that came from books that were
read by everyone who could read. The family retracts from its function as unit of
social reproduction and labour, to one of leisure and consumption. The shift from
a culture-debating (kulturrässonierend) to a culture-consuming public in the 20th
century is accelerated by the mass media, which replace debates with talk
shows, serious discourse with staged discussions, and public opinion with per-
sonal idiosyncracies. The public is now literally privatised, that is, de-prived of
its basic function, which is to act as a critical and coordinating force in society.
The literary public is barred from developing into a full-blown political public
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because it is caught between two forces: power and money. The impression one
gets from reading the last part of the Strukturwandel is that the critical and
radical virtues created by a literary public was in the end pre-empted by the
state and co-opted by the media market.
There are problems with this perspective. One problem is the conception in
the book of a bourgeois, universalistic and inclusive reason that inadvertently
turns out to be hegemonic, mono-cultural and thus exclusive. The objection is
raised, particularly from ‘feminist’ writers2, that the theory excludes parts of the
public sphere that are, on the face of it, particular, unreasonable and resist in-
clusion. A related problem is the idea of the public sphere as an arena for formal
or ‘pure’ practices of truth-related discourse. This idea easily neglects ambigu-
ous or mixed political expressions, which are easily dismissed as expressions of
indifference or withdrawal, or as concessions to the hegemony of state power
and moneyed interest. For obvious reasons the Strukturwandel could not take
into consideration two all-important developments of late modern society: multi-
culturality and the Internet. These developments, which have dominated the
Nineties, have shed new light on problems that existed in original text. Even if
the Internet is still a tool for those relatively few in the world who have access to
the technology, it increases the range and speed of interactions between people
who read and write and discuss. It has certainly contributed to the spread and
publicity of civil society organisations. Despite the din and clamour of contempo-
rary news media in our society, a wide public has now access to an unprece-
dented mass of political information, mediated by non-governmental organisa-
tions on the Internet, critical periodicals, broadsheet newspapers, letters to the
editor and so forth. Surely, critical journalism is threatened, rational debate is
tainted and impartial judgement may be hard to come by. But power and per-
suasion has been the problem of the public sphere before the coming of the elec-
tronic media.3
The outlook of the Strukturwandel does not include the fact that the reading
public was greatly extended in the last century by an expanding school system
and the growth of public libraries and museums, fed by books, magazines and
cartoons, which in their different ways contributed to public and political dis-
cussions. Nor does it draw on the variety of genres in literature, drama, fashion
and the fine arts as various forms of ‘abnormal’ discourse in the late 20th cen-
tury. Habermas’ vision is too purist to allow theoretically for this variety. His
idea of a public sphere is a formal one, in principle devoted to epistemic argu-
mentation, that is, a discourse directed at proposing and testing truth claims.
Communication that falls short of this stricture also falls outside the pale of
reasonable interaction. Habermas’ particular view of the public sphere and its
genesis is fundamentally determined by the reconstruction of an ideal public,
which makes the Strukturwandel a hybrid between historical analysis and
philosophical reconstruction. Already in the Strukturwandel we encounter the
method that marks Habermas’ authorship throughout: the reconstruction of the
rational foundation for a liberal democratic society.
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2. The ideal of a public sphere
There is a remarkable consistency over the years in Habermas’ idea of a liberal
democracy. The idea is of a liberal public with its basis in the ideas of mutual
respect between equals, equal access to cultural and political discussions, and
last but not least, the inclusion of all as possible participants in these demo-
cratic processes. In both the Strukturwandel and in the much later Wahrheit
und Rechtfertigung (1999) the public sphere figures as a rational reconstruction
of these ideal presumptions. This reconstruction is both a theoretical and philo-
sophical reconstruction of the quasi-transcendental presuppositions of individu-
ality and community. Its first aspect is autonomy in the Kantian sense of a
subject that is free in the use of his own reason, and thus able to step out of his
bondage to authority and power. The second aspect of rational reconstruction is
the mutual recognition between subjects that make them refer to themselves by
way of the other. The other makes the identity of the ‘I’ possible in the first
place. In Habermas’ scheme the social precedes the individual4, to the chagrin of
the neo-liberalist, who see the agent’s individual preference as the source of so-
cial action. His reconstruction embodies both the idea of a universalistic moral
judgement, by which everybody judges in accordance with a common reason:
and the idea of the mutual recognition that allows the self-respect of everybody
to flourish in a community.
There is a third aspect, which integrates the dialectic of the ‘I’ and the ‘we’.
This is the process or rather procedure that actualises the two in a the forma-
tion of democratic understanding and will. It is the ideal of rational argumenta-
tion according to objectivity, critique and fair play, which takes place between
persons who discuss theoretical, moral or political questions with the implicit
possibility of reaching a consensus. The ideas of autonomous individuality
(Kant) and mutual recognition (Hegel) are here transformed by the idea of a
procedural reason that is developed by real people in real social situations of
deliberation and argumentation. Reason is no longer an abstract, subjective
principle, nor a self-actualising force in history, but a self-transformative force,
embedded in the universal institution of concrete argumentative procedures. In
the article ‘Civil Society and the Constitutional State’, Habermas sums up his
view in this way: ‘Instead of talking about a democratic society that relates to,
observes and influences itself, such a political community ought to be described
as an arrangement of institutionalised discourses’5. Here he talks about the
public sphere in terms of a network of communication that connects the parlia-
mentary system, political planning and implementation to the interactions and
discussions of a wider political public.
The Strukturwandel tells us how the public sphere may operate under ideal
rational conditions. These conditions act on the one hand as ideals, on the other
hand as criteria for judging the virtues of a given political formation. The Struk-
turwandel was written well before these principles were worked out in detail as
part of a theory of communicative action and a basis for deliberative democracy.
But the idea of a communicative rationality appears here in an early shape. As
Habermas puts it: ‘Not that this idea of the public was actually realized in ear-
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nest in the coffee houses, the salons, and the societies; but as an idea it had be-
come institutionalized and thereby stated as an objective claim. If not realized it
was at least consequential.’ (Habermas 1989:36). It is this ideal view that makes
the Strukturwandel a debatable book; debatable because it is written from a
point of view that characteristically limits the public sphere to a specific rational
practice. Habermas’ conception of rationality also determines what falls within
and what falls outside of the public sphere. The trouble with the public sphere
as it is described in the Strukturwandel is a direct consequence of this ideal re-
construction, which cancels out the aspects of the public sphere that does not
own up to specific presupposition of rationality.
The Strukturwandel constructs the ideal from three aspects of the public
sphere as it appeared across Europe in the 18th century. First of all, there was a
disregard of wealth, power and prestige within reading and debating societies.
People came together sharing a common interest in philosophical, literary and
political questions, under the parity of a common humanity – das bloss Men-
schliche. Their discussions were educative in the sense that they confirmed the
mutual recognition between persons with a common concern. This is the aspect
of equality. Here equality is taken in the very general sense of sharing a com-
mon mental space and pursuing common intellectual ends. Second, these insti-
tutions produced knowledge, information and criticisms that could challenge the
authority of the church and the state. Their products – philosophical and liter-
ary works – created a market for cultural commodities. The public that was
formed had no traditional authority behind it, apart from the general respect for
knowledge, understanding and intellectual integrity. By widening the circles of
intellectual exchange, the public achieved its relative autonomy by its own force
and effort – a public space of autonomous persons who were engaged in reading
and discussions. This is the aspect of autonomy. Third, by creating a universal
market for discussion, the public established itself as inclusive. The idea of a
common humanity made it possible to think of the general access of everybody
to discussions, under the expectation that every person was potentially able to
participate. This is the aspect of inclusiveness, which, as we shall see, raises
particular problems.
2.1. The Toscani effect
In the next section my point of view is that the public sphere, as characterised
by the spirit of equality, autonomy and inclusiveness, is embedded in a culture
shot through with the hybrid, abnormal and multifaceted, and that the distinc-
tions between civil society, the state, and the market often fail to describe the
social reality we are part of. The postmodern is a muddled world, not necessary
more muddled than the 18th century, but certainly differently muddled. In this
picture the thesis about the decline and fall of the public sphere is too smooth
and general. Habermas’ reconstruction tends to blend out the hybrid aspects of
the public. It misses what, on his own account, is the essence of the early public
sphere: that it is always coming into being and also comes in surprising ways. It
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seems we have to look into the nooks and crannies of postmodern society in or-
der to see how the public sphere reproduces itself in different constellations, de-
spite the inclination to declare it dead and defunct.
The bad news for the future of the public sphere is, of course, all over the
screen. There is no doubt about that. Consider the possible shrinking of a well
informed reading public, the tabloidisation of the press, and the quasi-discussion
programmes on TV, which are agonistically pitting politicians in a fight for scor-
ing on the popularity ratings, artists peddling their works, and academics trying
to reason in ‘bits’ without really succeeding. And to top it all, now we have got re-
ality-TV, all of which have driven Die Zeit to flashing a call against stupidity on
its current Internet homepage. When the health of the public space is judged by
the spread of the tabloid media, the prospects of civil society may seem bleak.
But if we stop idealising the time when a bourgeois reading public defined the
public virtues; if we stop seeing those virtues only in terms of universal reason;
and if we drop the hegemony of truth-related argumentation, other theoretical
paths offer themselves.
Let me start by suggesting two cases in which the public surprisingly appears
in the context of family and social concern, of commodity exchange and public
expression. They are about advertising and booksellers, or to be more precise,
about Oliviero Toscani’s famous advertisements for Benetton and about Ama-
zon.com, the worldwide Internet bookstore. As part of Benetton’s branding cam-
paign during the Nineties, Toscani took photographs of refugees in Africa, Ital-
ian parents at the bedside of a son dying from AIDS and of black American con-
victs on Death Row. The photographs are of real life situations dramatised in
pieces of photographic art. On the face of it they appear as provocative com-
ments on contemporary social and political issues, just like any critical documen-
tary. But here is the nub: Toscani’s photographs are part of the marketing of a
brand name in fashion wear – Benetton. Human tragedy juxtaposed with mar-
keting! All of a sudden the photographs rub against the spectator’s sensibilities.
They abuse real life and trades on personal tragedy. The Italian family is deprived
of its dignity, the convicts are commercially exploited and our sympathy for
them is shattered in a strange denial of the whole setting created by Toscani.
There is, first of all, the feeling not so much of being deceived by the advertise-
ment as of being the forced accomplice in the corruption of social reality. The
photographs create a painful emotional dissonance by engaging our empathy
and make us feel cynically used. The viewer is untied from the human message
of the image and tied up with the machinations of a provocateur photographer.
But there is another aspect of the case. Toscani’s images not only show how
art photography stops representing reality and turns into a vehicle for artistic
imagination and persuasion. They show how photography has taken the further
step of juxtaposing artistic value and market value. Whilst artistic value tradi-
tionally has had its ground in more or less contested interpretations of culture,
market value is related to what works in the way of buying and selling. There is
a shift from interpretation to persuasion, from critical judgement to consumer
satisfaction. The instrumentalist intentions override that of the cultivation of
the mind. It seems that the market value scorns the fundamental feature of a
political Bildung. Yet the photographs are slyly educative. They provoke by the
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implied confrontation between a commercial intention and a moral reality, by
contrasting the life of the marketplace with that of moral life, and by contrast-
ing the ephemeral and the essential. There is cultivation at play here, but it is
indirect. The irony of Toscani’s ads is that the images of death shatter the com-
placency of the consumer’s gaze. One is reminded of the classical vanitas motif
that used to foreshadow the reality of death, in the traditional still-lifes of the
Spanish and Dutch painters of the 17th century. In these pictures are inserted a
number of paraphernalia, among them utensils, accessories and the ubiquitous
memento mori, remember-death items, typically the hourglass and the scull.
The hourglass typically alludes to the passing of time and to the frailty of hu-
man existence, the skull to Final Judgement and possible resurrection and sal-
vation. The photography has, of course, forfeited the virtues of the still-life. To-
scani’s photographs rather brutally call to mind the reality of death, the ravages
of epidemic illness and the stark reality of AIDS in contemporary society. What
might be called the Toscani effect goes beyond marketing. The satisfactions of
the market suddenly mix with the cult of death, from the grief at the bedside to
the memento mori of the still-life and the farewell scenes depicted on classical
Greek tombstones. Tombstones, still-lifes and photographs! Advertisement,
branding and profit! How to choose between these worlds? Wrong question! To-
scani trades on historical expressions of death and existential contemplation. At
the same time he puts the viewer in a state of cognitive dissonance and existen-
tial conflict. The interpretation of his pictures is suspended, ambiguous and un-
decided. Interpretation emerges as the cracks in the world. From these cracks
are born fresh expressions of personal and public concern, topics that have been
and still are part of the public sphere. Toscani’s ads contribute to a public
sphere that is not established as such, but repeatedly insinuates itself in differ-
ent and surprising contexts. The Toscani effect is an example of the unde-
cidability from which the public sphere emerges.6
2.2. The virtual public sphere
To my second example. Over the last decade the World Wide Web, the e-mail
and the mobile phone has created a new virtual public sphere. Consider Ama-
zon.com, the virtual bookstore. Apart from doing business by selling books
cheaper than traditional bookstores, it has, over the past few years, grown into a
virtual reading and discussion society, too. Apart from listing its books for sale,
it started to tell its customers which additional books were preferred by other
customers; part an invitation to buy more books, part information that there are
other readers with similar interests ‘out there’. Amazon.com has, for all practi-
cal purposes, made the move towards creating a virtual reading society. Today
Amazon.com offers not only customer’s ratings of books, but customer’s reviews
and editor’s reviews as well. As a customer you are invited to write a review, or
to e-mail a friend about a book that you fancy, or even enter a used books mar-
ket. The Amazon.com bookstore is, in distinction to book clubs, inherently inter-
active. On the Internet the reading societies of the 18th century have been given
a new lease on life. They are given a start, not unlike the traditional one, in
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which people begin to educate themselves by informal association with like-
minded people. In a surprising way virtual reading and debating groups per-
fectly fit Habermas’ three characteristic of the public sphere: equality, autonomy
and inclusiveness.
The literary public of the 18th century, then, is not defunct; it lives and
thrives on the Internet. Anybody can enter Amazon.com or a chat forum on the
Internet without having any formal credentials. You may be poor on Kant’s
philosophy, an amateur on classical music, and only a novice in political think-
ing. If you are interested, there is nothing to prevent you from partaking in the
virtual public sphere. If a person can handle the keyboard and the software, and
has the necessary social skills and the wit that goes with literary discussions, she
is a qualified member. Surely, qualification is not the same as equality. Yet the
ideal of equality can only be entertained in a society that judge people according to
their imputed qualifications as members of that society, which makes for inclu-
siveness.7 The Amazon.com literary sphere is not like a local reading circle or even
a newspaper or magazine with its limited readership. As measured by electronic
speed and global scope, it is all-inclusive. It is part of a worldwide reading public
that consolidates itself as a public and thus establishes its autonomy. The com-
modity that is sold on Amazon.com is not only books, but ideas, practices and in-
dividual skills. A business venture like Amazon.com thus realises a public that
was unthinkable only a few years ago. Amazon.com is only one example of how
economic and cultural interests combine to remake and revitalise the public
sphere.
2.3. Border rationalities
I have used examples from advertising and the Internet to suggest that the pic-
ture of today’s public sphere is mixed, multiple and hybrid, or what you prefer to
call it. This world is not easily given to idealisations. That brings me back to the
problem of Habermas’ two-tier description of the public sphere, that is, its real
history and its idealisation. I will try and show how this partition, for all its vir-
tues, does not succeed philosophically. The problem is the narrow definition of
rationality, first as institutional, that is, mediated by language, work and inter-
action, second as procedural, that is, controlled by the validation of truth claims,
and third as limited to a civil society independent of state power and moneyed
interest. One way to connect the real and ideal public sphere seems to be the
following. We make a distinction between the real and the rational world and
make the public sphere into two parts. One part is the hybrid and manifaceted;
the other is controlled by the consistent procedures of rational discourse and ne-
gotiation. Within the first realm we have no serious rationality pretensions, in
the other we are epistemically committed to argumentation and validation pro-
cedures by persons of a sound mind or characterised as zurechnungsfähige. This
is fine as it goes, but it does not solve our problem. Habermas’ conception of the
public sphere is the victim of a disjunctive logic that splits the social sphere in
‘reasonable pluralism’ on the one hand and ‘unreasonable pluralism’ on the
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other (Callan 1997:22)8. In this rationalist scheme there is little tolerance for
the mixed expressions of rationality that we regularly meet in the everyday
world. The distinction that is drawn between reason and unreason bars us from
seeing the ambiguous events in the Benetton ads as part of an emergent public
sphere.
The distinction creates a bottom-up problem. When does a social event cross
the threshold of rational discourse? The dichotomy also creates a top-down
problem. How can the outcome of felicitous rational argumentation be fed back
into the life-world from whence it got its impetus? There seems to be no logical
link from the moral or political conclusions reached by reasonable argumenta-
tion to their application in everyday life. This logical gap forced Habermas at
one point to insert a secondary ad hoc application discourse – Anwendungdis-
kurs – that should bridge the gap between the rational argumentation of the Be-
gründungsdiskurs and the nitty-gritty realities of the everyday world. The res-
cue operation failed because the application discourse only repeated the criteria
that determined the rationality of the first. As Habermas himself conceded, the
application discourse was just another version of the ‘pure cognitive business’ of
procedural reason. (Habermas 1991:114). In other words, the problem of proce-
dural reason is solved by more of the same, which only repeats the problem we
had in the first place.
This theoretical quarrel is not primarily one that the rationalist has with ad-
verse or competing positions, like communitarianism or deconstruction. It points
to a problem within the rationalist position itself. Logically the problem is about
the self-imposed limits of rational procedures; theoretically it restricts the life of
the public sphere by passing over the ambiguities, ironies and expressiveness of
people who are publicly engaged. In order to save civil society for rational dis-
cussion and debate, the rationalist cleans the public sphere of its crude motives,
rough methods and raucous language. But what seems to be irrational actions
and a-rational measures may not only initiate rational solutions to public prob-
lems. They may act as pro-rational beginnings of a public sphere that reproduces
itself by new beginnings. In the early Eighties sit-down protests against the viola-
tion of Sami minority rights in Norway lead to massive confrontation with the po-
lice. In the aftermath measures were taken to create a national Sami Parliament.
The Sami culture is now protected by constitutional rights. Another controversial
example is the recent demonstrations against corporate capitalism and big gov-
ernment, which spectacularly entered the scene in Seattle in 1999, with a re-
ported number of 40 000 demonstrators recruited from free association and labour
unions alike. The last mass demonstration in connection with the EU summit in
Sweden in the spring of 2001 gathered a reported 20 000 people. It was exploited
by extremists and badly handled by the police, which typically made the media
miss the fact that at least 98 % of the people gathering in Gothenburg where
peaceful demonstrators with articulated political views and responsibilities. The
downside with a cognitive theory of rational action is that it may overlook legiti-
mate protest actions because these happenings do not satisfy criteria of rational
discussion and deliberation. The theory does not in principle tolerate mixed or
border rationalities.
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2.4. Exclusive reason(s)
I have suggested that border rationalities, which have their place outside argumentative
discourse and are expressed in new shapes in the real and the virtual world, may issue in
rational action. Yet they may be put aside as the excluded other, which historically have
been represented by the non-propertied, women, homosexuals and now those who demon-
strate against global capitalism in the streets. The gender issue is a case in point.
Habermas has been roundly criticised for neglecting the gender issue, both in the Struk-
turwandel and in later writings. The gender blindness of Habermas’ theory is systematic.
A discussion started in 1982 with Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice. The book was
not directed at Habermas, but at Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development
(Kohlberg 1981). The book took issue with Kohlberg’s ranking of Kantian universalism, as
modelled on the categorical imperative, as the 6th and highest stage in children’s moral
development. Gilligan argued that the 3rd stage, that of the ‘good girl’ attitude, described
the way women as a group actually solved moral quandaries. She tried to show how
Kohlberg’s hegemonic notion of moral functioning not only down-rated women’s ethical
thinking; it also excluded one half of humanity from the group of fully functioning moral
persons. The subsequent critique of Habermas’ gender blindness by women writers in the
Nineties points to a continuing lacunae: a theory of communicative action that paradoxi-
cally excludes by its own principle of inclusion. It thus defeats one of the idealised pillars
of the public sphere that is found in the Strukturwandel. More than any other issue, the
gender quarrel shows how a universalistic position can only be defended today as a par-
ticular position.9
It is worth noting another limit of Habermas’ liberal democratic rationality. Its idea of
rationality is indebted to the notion of the subject as a person that accepts a law of its
own making and thus confirms its own sovereign identity. This proposition may sound
exaggerated, especially after I have drawn attention to Habermas’ defence of intersubjec-
tivity as mediated by the institutions of work, language and interaction. But let me pur-
sue the theme, if only to broach a problematic that suggests an alternative to an exclusive
rationalism. Let me start with centredness, or rather the place of the other in centredness.
As already mentioned, Habermas joins individual autonomy and inclusiveness in the con-
cept of intersubjectivity. Rational discourse assures everyone’s impartial judgement of
common norms. ‘That demands a decentring of one’s own understanding of self and the
world by the mutual consideration of the perspectives of all the other participants’. (Haber-
mas 1999:193). Intersubjectivity is here described as the capability of an individual to put
him or herself in the shoes of the other. The ‘inter’ of subjectivity combines an ‘I’ that con-
firms its identity by partaking in the ‘we’ that issue from the mutual recognition between
individuals.
The term decenter, however, invariably invokes a centre from which the individual de-
centres, or takes his or her perspective on the other. The initiative and the movement in
this act issue from a self that takes the other’s point of view from its own perspective. But
taking the other’s point of view by decentring or by cognitive empathy may involve keep-
ing and even confirming one’s own point of view. Against this imputed solipsism it may be
argued that there are not one but two mutually decentring subjects who meet in inter-
subjectivity. But this move does not avoid subject-centredness. Egocentrism is difficult to
beat even under the best of circumstances, as every psychologist knows. It often imposes a
‘theorising’ or explaining of the other, not to mention the problem of transference in the
relation between client and therapist. In Habermas’ scheme reconciliation is part of a
logic, or rather dialectic that in the end assures what has been implicit from the begin-
ning, which is the sovereign subject that identifies itself as autonomous in discursive ra-
tionality. A transformed version of Kant’s critical and Hegel’s idealist philosophy still
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holds on to a concept of rationality that is universalistic in thought and therefore exclu-
sive in practice. This logic has repercussions both in the political and the cultural field. As
Charles Taylor argues, what is universal and thus difference-blind, turns out to be ‘[i]n
fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. As it turns out, then, only the minority or sup-
pressed cultures are being forced to take an alien form. So the supposedly fair and differ-
ence-blind society is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a sub-
tle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory.’ (Taylor 1995:236f). Taylor thinks
that this is a cruel argument against communicative rationality. But writers who press
the gender issue have persuasively established a link between gendered rationality and
discriminatory practices.10 The logic of discourse ethics and the politics of inclusion issue
in the exclusion of unreasonable pluralism.
3. The problem of toleration
In Creating Citizens Eamon Callan asks: ‘How should we respond politically to the con-
tinued social presence of unreasonable pluralism?’ And he answers: ‘This is the problem
of toleration.’ (Callan 1995:22). His distinction between reasonable pluralism and unrea-
sonable pluralism chimes with the logic of Habermas’ rational discourse. But there is a
difference. Habermas thinks in terms of political consensus, Callan in terms of political
toleration. Habermas’ push is towards inclusion and assimilation. Callan thinks we have
to cope with unreasonable pluralism by way of toleration, defined as the freedom from co-
ercion by the majority of reasonable pluralists. He is ready to accept difference as un-
avoidable and so opts for toleration. But Habermas ends in Callan’s position by default.
Since reasoning is restricted to rational agreement, those who do not partake in rational
discourse have to be tolerated. Toleration, then, is to allow differences of opinion and
practice without discrimination. Now imagine that there are ways of living that a person
cannot understand and respect as a valuable life; that there are cultural practices that he
or she cannot condone, cannot partake in and cannot be reconciled to. This is multicul-
tural society, and here is where toleration comes in. Toleration does not head towards
reconciliation as the ideal limit of cultural interaction. Toleration is to leave the other as
other, that is, as different without any evaluative efforts to rank the other as better or
worse on a cultural scale. Toleration shies away from a politics of assimilation, the idea
that the other can only be tolerated if he or she becomes one of us, in the way they speak,
dress and comport themselves.
Toleration is particularly suspicious of the voice of the majority, which, as John Stuart
Mill observed in On Liberty, easily turns into the tyranny of the majority: ‘[t]here needs
protection also against the tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency
of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as
rules of conduct on those who dissent from them.’ (Mill 1991:26). Toleration is to allow the
other to live his or her lifes, even if one abhors it, dislikes it or just feel alienated from it.
But toleration is not indifferent to cultural multiplicity. Toleration is toleration of differ-
ence, it is difference conscious, as it were. Toleration in the sense of a cultural and politi-
cal practice further depends on tolerance, that is, the psychological capacity to sustain
cognitive dissonance and lack of closure. Tolerance is the personal attitude that takes cul-
tural differences as part of a world that does not come together or conforms to the ways
he or she expects.
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3.1. The birth of the public sphere
In the Strukturwandel Habermas has told the story of the coming-into-being of the public
sphere. I have argued that the story is determined by an idealised conception of the public
sphere in terms of equality, autonomy and inclusiveness. His description of the decline
and fall of the public sphere in the second part of the book is not accidental, but inti-
mately tied up with these presuppositions. I find the question of the birth of the public
sphere more important and promising than the question of its decline. Now, if we are in-
terested in the birth of the public, we must ask the question of its coming into being be-
fore any rational reconstruction of an ideal public sphere, and before rational procedures
for solving theoretical and practical disagreement. I suggest that we start with freedom,
which vibrates through all liberal democratic thinking.
Hannah Arendt raises the question of the birth of political action in a general way in
her book The Human Condition, under the name of ‘natality’. ‘If action as beginning cor-
responds to the fact of birth, if it is the actualisation of the human condition of natality,
then speech corresponds to the fact of distinctness and is the actualisation of the human-
ity, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being among equals.’ (Arendt 1958:178). If
natality is shorthand for beginning something new, the freedom of the new must come
even before the new is actualised in thinking or acting. Just like the child is born before
the birth is institutionalised in social rituals of care taking, ‘[f]reedom was created when
man was created’ (p. 177), that is, before it was institutionalised. It is the question of
freedom before its formulation in positive law, before processes of mutual recognition has
taken their course and before the individual is politically gebildet. It is the question of
freedom, even, before the introduction of the ambiguous, multiple and hybrid, terms that
belong to the social description of postmodern society.
Freedom cannot only be the product of idealisations, but must in some way or other pre-
cede them. Equality cannot only be substantiated in positive law without losing its spirit. Its
freedom from positive law is paradoxical. Its freedom is, in the name of the law, to free peo-
ple from the oppression of positive and unchanging law. This freedom is the rationale of civil
disobedience, as it has been practised since the fights for black rights in the US in the Six-
ties. But again, the question is not about the birth of civil disobedience, it is about the birth
of freedom. The answer first takes us to the extreme position of the insubstantiality that is
suggested by Arendt’s natality. A beginning that is not substantiated in a political self-
sufficiency or Mündigkeit in the Kantian sense or even in the concept of a liberal democracy.
It is a beginning that transcends the self-sufficiency of these positions and that un-positions
itself by denying the foreclosing of speech as truth-related discourse. It thereby frees action
for the unexpected, the surprise, the breaking forth of the different. We should not forget
the psychological fact that children live in a world where the unexpected is part of everyday
life and where surprise is received as the sweet welcoming of the new.
For Arendt speech expresses the singular or unique. This is not free speech in the po-
litical sense, but speech as it precedes any political use. This freedom of speech is not
‘caused’ by anything else. There is no First Amendment or law that give us this freedom in
the first place, and there is no psychological or even transcendental capability or Vermögen
involved. Freedom is only tied up with itself, it is its own act of freedom. As Jean-Luc Nancy
has it in The Experience of Freedom: ‘Auto-nomy, which has always represented the very re-
gime of freedom, must be understood on this basis: as a legislation by the self in which the
self does not pre-exist, since its very existence is what is prescribed by the law, and this law
itself is not based on any right, since it founds with its own juris-diction the possibility of a
“right” in general.’ (Nancy 1993:107). For freedom to be free it cannot be preceded by any-
thing but itself. Freedom in the sense of natality comes into being by its own jurisdiction,
that is, literally by speaking its own law, which ensures its autonomy.
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3.2. Towards a politics of toleration
Before freedom is established as right within the constitutional state, it must be the event
of freedom. This notion is a radicalisation of Hegel’s ‘idea’ as the unity of thought and
object, radical in the sense of doing without the dialectics of recognition. The unity of self
and world in freedom is rather the singular events or tying of the knots between persons
and the world. According to Nancy politics is a ‘seizure of speech’ or prise de parole, which
he describes further as ‘[t]he emergence or passage of some one and every one into the en-
chainment of sense effects, statement and offering in phrase or outline, including the cry,
the call, and the complaint as much as the theoretical discourse, the poem, and the song,
along with the gesture and even silence.’ (Nancy 1997:115). The emergence of freedom
takes place, not as categories, concepts or procedures, but as events in their different ex-
pressions. The coming into presence or presencing of freedom defies any distinction be-
tween reasonable and unreasonable pluralism. The enchainment that Nancy talks about
does not converge towards a consensus, and it is not the master idea of an origin or even
future of freedom. It is not expressive in the Romantic sense either, expressive, that is, of
my identity or of individual empowerment. Freedom is, to use a word play, is a knot that
is a (k)not, that is, the tying and untying of knots, and therefore always singular. It is a
communication that is always beginning anew. In this sense communication is unde-
cidable, it does not know what to say or where to head. The undecidable requires a deci-
sion. Freedom involves the expression of will and determination. In this sense it is the
impossible that makes itself possible, which is the moment of ‘deconstruction’ that is in-
volved in this way of thinking. Communication is the (k)not of tying and untying, the
(k)not that ‘[i]nvolves neither interiority nor exteriority but which, in being tied, cease-
lessly makes the inside pass outside, each into (or by way of) the other, the outside inside,
turning endlessly back on itself without returning to itself ….’ (Nancy 1997:111). This cir-
cular way of writing wrenches the reader out of thinking in categories and dichotomies
like subject-object, essence-existence, meaning-expression etc. Nancy goes beyond any
politics of recognition and reconciliation by suggesting a politics of difference, which is the
politics of tying and untying the (k)nots of communication. He unties the mutually exclu-
sive link that Callan creates between reasonable and unreasonable pluralism by decon-
structing the secret hegemonic pretensions in it. Now the suggestion that we seek a mid-
dle position between the two, does not solve our problem, for we have already abandoned
the dialectics of reconciliation as a self-sufficient position of its own. Yet, Nancy does not
propose a ‘new’ philosophy. He just shows how we can get unstuck from philosophical
schemes by asking the question of political freedom before we come up with the mutually
exclusive notions of reasonable and unreasonable or the idea of a procedural reason. He
proposes a radical politics of toleration, that is, a politics that not only takes its point of
departure in toleration, but tolerates its own auto-nomy as non-identity, or rather, the
tying and untying of identity. That brings me back to toleration and the public sphere.
In Callan’s scheme toleration marks the limit of reason, it is called on when reasonable
pluralism is exhausted. If we start thinking in terms of tying and untying the reasonable-
unreasonable knot, however, toleration is not a way of tying up or ‘solving’ cases of unrea-
sonable pluralism by refraining from coercion. Toleration is rather the tying-untying that
takes place as an event, or that presents itself and comes into being when Callan’s defini-
tion of tolerance exposes its own undecidability. This opens up the space in which toler-
ance becomes the (k)not that ‘turns back on itself without returning to itself’ in a concrete
politics of toleration. A politics of toleration involves procedures for tolerantly living in an
intolerant society. I think that toleration rather than reconciliation and consensus gives
access to the open space where the public can come to an understanding of itself as par-
taking in the birth of the public sphere. The story of a lost public space in a time where the
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forces of civil society is depleted by the state, usurped by masculine reason and exploited by
the media-market complex – this story is, of course, well documented. The division of labour,
social distinction and the differentiation of lifestyles in postmodern society makes the idea
of a politics of recognition, at least in its Habermasian ‘idealist’ shape, utopian in the sense
of a reasonable world longed for, but lost. Toleration is the other of reason and thus marks
the impossibility of reason. But toleration is also the possibility of reason, because it marks
the beginning of reason: it marks the ‘natality’, not only of existence, but also of the politi-
cal, and thus the possible birth of a public sphere. The public sphere cannot be described
within the limits of reason bequeathed us from the French Revolution. That makes for an
illegitimate circumcision of the public, circumcision being the sovereign act of inclusion into
an established culture, an initiation into the cult of the selfsame, as in the ritual of cir-
cumcision. Toleration resists inclusion, and therefore opens up for the birth of the new. A
toleration of the other in its otherness is the (k)not that a postmodern public sphere has
to struggle with and – in the end – try to make into a political education.
Notes
1 From The College Survey of English Literature, the shorter edition. Harcourt, Brace
and World (1951), pp. 532ff.
2 Apart from Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982), see Nancy Fraser’s Unruly
Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (1989), Sheila
Benhabib’s Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contempo-
rary Ethics (1992), just to mention a few ‘feminist’ writers. Books mentioned only in
the notes will not be repeated in the reference list. In general I have taken the liberty
to reduce footnotes and references to a minimum.
3 I shall forgo a discussion on the politics of the Internet. There is a burgeoning litera-
ture on the Internet and the Internet and politics. See for example Mike Sandbo-
the/Winfried Marotzki (Hrsg): Subjektivität und Öffentlichkeit, Kulturwissenschaftli-
che Grundlagenprobleme virtueller Welten (2000), Tim Jordan: Cyberpower. The Cul-
ture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet (1999), Liberating Cyberspace, Civil
Liberties, Human Rights & the Internet, edited by Liberty (1999), and Chris Toulouse/
Timothy W. Luke (ed): The Politics of Cyberspace (1998).
4 See the article ,Individuierung durch Vergesellschaftung‘. In Habermas (1988).
5 I have not been able to track this article beyond the Norwegian edition of Habermas’
mainly political articles in Jürgen Habermas (1999): Kraften i de bedre argumenter,
edited by Ragnvald Kalleberg, p. 73.
6 For the record: Toscani was fired last year from Benetton following the Death Row
advertisement, probably because it was too political for the America consumer and, in
the end, too contra-productive as part of a branding campaign.
7 The books listed in note 2, discuss the downsides of life on the Internet as well, among
them the well-known mechanisms of dominance, control and exclusion, mechanisms,
which, of course, are only repeated on the Internet.
8 The distinction is Callan’s, who writes in the Rawlsian liberal political tradition.
Habermas’ differences with Rawls are taken up in two articles in Habermas 1996 pp.
65-127. Yet the question raised by Callan’s distinction dovetails with Habermas’.
9 The gender issue is taken up in several articles in Craig Calhoun (ed): Habermas and
the Public Sphere 1992. See also Benhabib, Sheila: Situating the Self. Cambridge
1992. Other issues mentioned in my article are treated in Stephen K. White: The
Cambridge Companion to Habermas. Cambridge 1995, and in Peter Dews (ed):
Habermas, A Critical Reader. Malden, Mass. 1999. The deconstruction issue is taken
up particularly in Maurizio P. D’Entrèves/Sheila Benhabib (ed): Habermas and the
Unfinished Project of Modernity. Cambridge 1996. From the specific educational point
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of view, see Masschelein, Jan/Wimmer, Michael: Alterität, Pluralität, Gerechtigkeit.
Leuven 1996, and Gert J.J. Biesta/Geert Jan J.M. Stams: ‘Critical Thinking and the
Question of Critique’: Some Lessons from Deconstruction. In Studies in Philosophy
and Education. Vol 20/1, Jan 2001, pp 57-74.
10 See especially Craig Calhoun (ed): Habermas and the Public Sphere (1992), in which
several contributions takes Habermas to task on this matter.
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